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Showing posts with label Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Show all posts

Sunday, May 31, 2026

Cities as Data: Reflections on AI-Powered Urban Analytics at Geospatial World Forum 2026 Amsterdam, May 2026 : Panel-3

The third session I participated in at GWF 2026 shifted register somewhat away from the explicitly military framing of the earlier panels and toward something that affects a broader audience: how artificial intelligence is being applied to understand, manage, and secure urban infrastructure at scale. The audience was a mix of city planners, defence-adjacent technologists, data scientists, and policy people. That breadth made for a different kind of conversation.

Session 1 carried the title AI-Powered Urban Analytics: Data Science for Infrastructure Intelligence and the framing was deliberately wide. Urban infrastructure is a category that encompasses power grids, water systems, transport networks, telecommunications, public health monitoring, and the physical built environment. The question the session kept returning to was: what does it actually mean to apply AI to something this complex, this consequential, and this hard to fully observe?


The Infrastructure Intelligence Problem

Modern cities generate continuous data. Sensors embedded in roads, buildings, utilities, and public spaces produce streams that no human analyst team could meaningfully process at speed. AI-powered urban analytics is the attempt to make that data operationally useful not just archived, but acted upon.

The infrastructure intelligence framing matters because it shifts the goal from description to anticipation. A system that tells you a water main failed is useful. A system that identifies the precursor signatures of failure before it happens is transformative. That gap between reactive monitoring and predictive intelligence is where most of the serious work is being done, and where most of the serious risks live.



Bayesian Program Learning for Urban Pattern Recognition

One of the contributions I brought to this session was the relevance of Bayesian program learning as a framework for urban analytics problems. Most deployed urban AI systems are pattern-matchers  they learn from historical data and recognise recurrences. That works well in stable environments with abundant labelled data. Urban infrastructure is neither.

Bayesian program learning approaches the problem differently: rather than learning from volume, it learns programmes structured representations of how things work from very few examples, and generalises from those. In an urban context, this matters when you're trying to reason about rare events: infrastructure failure modes that have only occurred once or twice, novel threat signatures in a utility network, or unusual movement patterns in a city under stress. A purely statistical model trained on normal conditions will miss these. A model that has learned a causal programme for how the system behaves has a better chance of flagging the anomalous.

I raised this not as a deployed solution most urban analytics stacks are nowhere near this but as the direction that serious infrastructure intelligence work needs to move toward.



Differentially Private Federated Learning Across Urban Sensor Networks

Urban data is politically and legally sensitive in ways that military data is sensitive operationally. A smart city sensor network aggregates information about the movement, behaviour, and patterns of civilian populations. Centralising that data for AI training creates privacy exposure, legal liability, and in authoritarian contexts, a surveillance infrastructure that outlasts its original purpose.

I discussed Differentially Private Federated Learning as the architecture that makes urban analytics viable without those costs. The federated component means models are trained locally at the sensor node, the district server, the utility substation — and only model updates, not raw data, are shared upward. The differential privacy component means those updates are mathematically protected: calibrated noise is added such that no individual data point can be reconstructed from the aggregated model.

The practical implication is that a city can run a shared infrastructure intelligence model across its transport, utilities, and public safety systems without any single entity including the city government itself holding a centralised dataset of resident behaviour. That is not a minor privacy nicety. In a world where urban data infrastructure is increasingly a target, both for criminal actors and for state-level adversaries, it is an operational security consideration.


Sovereign AI and Urban Infrastructure

A thread that ran through this session, and one I pushed on, was the question of sovereign AI models in the urban context. Most cities deploying AI-powered analytics are doing so through commercial platforms often built on models trained elsewhere, hosted on infrastructure they don't control, and updated on schedules set by vendors.


The dependency this creates is underappreciated. A city's infrastructure intelligence layer, if it runs on a foreign-hosted model, is a city whose understanding of its own infrastructure is mediated by someone else's system. In peacetime that is a procurement question. In a crisis, a cyberattack, a natural disaster, a period of geopolitical tension, it becomes something more serious.

Sovereign AI in this context doesn't mean every city builds its own foundation model. It means the critical analytical layer that interprets infrastructure data runs on systems that are nationally or regionally governed, auditable, and resilient to external interference. The conversation around this at GWF was notably more advanced among European participants than I'd expected there is genuine policy momentum here, driven in part by the EU AI Act's implications for critical infrastructure AI.



AI Security Threats in Urban Systems

I flagged AI security threats specifically in the urban analytics context because the attack surface is different from military systems but no less consequential. Urban AI systems make or inform decisions about infrastructure allocation, anomaly response, and resource deployment. An adversary who understands how those systems work has options.

The threat I spent the most time on was adversarial input manipulation crafting sensor data or environmental conditions that cause an urban AI system to misclassify a situation. A power grid anomaly misclassified as normal. A movement pattern misclassified as routine. These aren't hypothetical attack vectors; they are documented in research and increasingly relevant as urban systems become more automated.

Persuasive AI came up in a different register here. In urban planning and infrastructure investment decisions, AI-generated analysis increasingly shapes what decision-makers see and prioritise. A system that surfaces certain patterns, routes certain recommendations, or frames trade-offs in particular ways can subtly steer decisions without any single output being obviously wrong. I raised this not as a conspiracy framing but as a design responsibility: the people building urban analytics systems need to think carefully about how their outputs are presented, what they omit, and whose interests the framing serves. Algorithmic outputs in consequential civic decisions warrant the same scrutiny we'd apply to any other form of expert advice.


What the Session Left Open

The honest closing note I'd offer on this session is that urban analytics as a field is at an interesting and slightly uncomfortable moment. The technical capability is running ahead of the governance frameworks. Cities are deploying AI systems for infrastructure management under procurement timelines that don't allow for the kind of adversarial stress-testing, privacy auditing, or sovereign architecture review that the stakes warrant.

GWF brought some of the right people into the same room. Whether those conversations translate into procurement standards, policy frameworks, or architectural requirements at the city level is the harder question and one that won't be answered at a conference.

Series: Geospatial World Forum 2026, RAI Amsterdam | April 27 – May 1


Wednesday, May 27, 2026

Reflections on Network-Centric Warfare at Geospatial World Forum 2026 Amsterdam, May 2026: When Data Becomes a Weapon : Panel -1

Earlier this year I received an invitation to participate in the Geospatial World Forum 2026 at the RAI Amsterdam  that is one of the more substantive gatherings in the Geospatial and Defence intelligence space. The week ran from April 27 through May 1, and I found myself sitting across from some of the sharpest practitioners working at the intersection of spatial intelligence, defence systems, and emerging technology. The conversations were candid, the perspectives diverse, and the stakes  given the current geopolitical climate  very real.

I was part of three panel discussions across the week. This is the first of a short series of posts where I'm putting down what we discussed  mostly for my own records, partly because these conversations deserve to exist somewhere beyond a conference hall.

Panel Discussion 5: Network-Centric Warfare and Data Centricity

The session title sounds clinical and crisp. What it actually described was one of the most consequential shifts in modern military doctrine  the move away from platform-centric thinking toward a model where the network itself is the force multiplier.

The core premise is straightforward: a sensor that sees something is only useful if that observation reaches a decision-maker before the window closes. In legacy architectures, that gap  between observation and action  has historically been where wars are lost. Network-centric warfare is the systematic attempt to collapse that gap.

Linking Sensors, Platforms, and Decision-Makers

What struck me most in our discussion was how mature the concept is, and how immature the execution still remains in many theatres. The vision is elegant: sensors  whether satellite, UAV, ground-based radar, or human intelligence feeds  pipe data into a unified digital ecosystem where platforms (vehicles, aircraft, naval assets) and decision-makers share a common operational picture in near-real-time.


The friction points are less glamorous. We talked about data standardisation across allied forces, legacy systems that weren't designed to interoperate, and the latency that creeps in at every translation layer. One of the panellists made a point I keep returning to: the weakest link in most network-centric architectures isn't the sensor  it's the middleware.


 
Rapid Data Sharing for Coordinated Response

The session highlight framing mentioned "coordinated and adaptive combat responses"  and this is where the discussion got genuinely interesting. Adaptive is the operative word. A static command-and-control model assumes that orders flow downward and the environment cooperates. Modern conflict doesn't offer that.

What network-centricity enables, at its best, is a force that can recompose itself in response to ground truth rather than responding to a plan that was made twelve hours ago. That requires not just fast data pipelines, but trust in those pipelines. Operators need to act on data they haven't personally verified. That's a significant psychological and institutional shift, and it came up more than once.

We also touched on the adversarial dimension  what happens when an opponent understands your data architecture well enough to inject noise, delay, or disinformation into it. The network that enables adaptive response can also be the attack surface. This bleeds directly into the cyber-geospatial panel I was part of later in the week, which I'll cover in the next post.

Situational Awareness, Force Agility, and Mission Effectiveness

These three phrases tend to travel together in defence literature, sometimes as buzzwords. In practice, they describe a genuine capability gradient.

Situational awareness at the tactical level means a soldier knows what's beyond the next ridgeline. At the operational level, it means a commander understands how a theatre is evolving across multiple simultaneous engagements. Network-centric architecture is what connects those two levels and everything between.

Force agility  the ability to reposition, reassign, or re-task elements quickly  is a direct function of how good that common picture is. If your forces are operating on shared, current data, you can exploit opportunities and respond to threats faster than an opponent who isn't.

Mission effectiveness is the output of the two above, but it also depends on something the technology can't fully provide: trained humans who can interpret ambiguous data and make decisions under pressure. We spent some time on this. The risk of over-automating the common operational picture is that you optimise for the scenario you modelled, not the one you're actually in.


WHAT I DISCUSSED 

On ZTA in networked battlefield architecture: One of the points I raised was why Zero Trust Architecture isn't optional in a network-centric environment  it's foundational. When you're linking sensors, platforms, and decision-makers across a distributed ecosystem, the old perimeter-defence model collapses entirely. Every node, every data feed, every inter-platform handshake has to be treated as potentially compromised. Assume breach, verify continuously, grant least-privilege access. In a coalition context especially, where you're operating with allied systems you don't fully control, ZTA is the only architecture that makes operational sense.

On zero-day exposure in sensor-platform pipelines:I brought up zero-day vulnerabilities specifically in the context of the network's attack surface. The more you integrate  sensors feeding platforms feeding command layers  the more entry points you create. A zero-day in a firmware layer of a battlefield edge device isn't just an IT problem; it's a potential blind spot or worse, a spoofed data feed entering your common operational picture. The network that gives you agility is the same network that, if unpatched and unmonitored, gives an adversary a quiet way in.

On homomorphic encryption for coalition data sharing: A practical problem in joint operations is that allied nations need to share processed intelligence without exposing raw sensor data to each other's systems. I discussed homomorphic encryption as a maturing solution here  the ability to run computation on encrypted data means a partner nation's AI layer can query your dataset without you ever decrypting it on their side. We're not at frictionless deployment yet, but the direction is clear.

On Differentially Private Federated Learning for shared battlefield AI: Federated learning lets distributed nodes  forward units, vehicles, command posts  contribute to a shared intelligence model without centralising raw operational data. Add differential privacy on top of that, and you're injecting calibrated noise into each node's contribution such that no individual data point can be reverse-engineered. I raised this as the architecture that makes collaborative battlefield AI viable without creating a single honeypot of sensitive operational data.


 
On sovereign AI models: This came up when we discussed why coalition forces can't simply share an AI layer the way they might share a radio frequency. Every nation feeding data into a shared model is implicitly exporting its operational patterns, its sensor signatures, its tactical doctrine. Sovereign AI  models trained and hosted within national infrastructure, on national data  isn't protectionism, it's operational security. Interoperability has to happen at the interface layer, not by pooling the model itself.

On distillation attacks against tactical AI: I flagged distillation attacks as an underappreciated threat vector in deployed military AI. If an adversary can interact with your tactical decision-support system enough times  even indirectly, through observing its outputs in the field  they can begin reconstructing its behaviour in a surrogate model. You've effectively handed them your doctrine without them ever touching your training data. Access control to AI system outputs matters as much as access control to the data that trained it.

On KASLR bypass at the edge: At the device level, KASLR bypass deserves attention in hardened military hardware. Kernel Address Space Layout Randomisation is a standard mitigation, but known bypass techniques mean it can't be the last line of defence on edge battlefield devices. I raised this in the context of the network's physical endpoints  the sensors and terminals that are closest to the threat environment and furthest from the patch cycle.

More from Amsterdam in the next post  on cyber-geospatial convergence and what it means to protect digital borders that exist in three-dimensional space.

Thursday, August 28, 2025

DSCI Best Practices Meet 2025 – Panel Discussion on "Battlefields Beyond Borders ... Military Conflict and Industry" : Dr Anupam Tiwari

1.    I had the privilege of being invited as a panel speaker at the 17th edition of the DSCI Best Practices Meet in Bengaluru on August 21, 2025. The event brought together global experts to discuss the cutting-edge challenges and evolving trends in cybersecurity.

2.    During our panel discussion, we delved into a wide range of critical topics that are shaping the future of security in both military and industrial domains. Some of the key subjects explored included:

  • Quantum Proofs of Deletion
  • Machine Unlearning
  • Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
  • Quantum Navigation
  • Homomorphic Encryption
  • Post-Quantum Blockchains
  • Neuromorphic Computing
  • Data Diodes
  • Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
  • Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP)
  • Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)
  • Connectomics
  • Atomic Clocks
  • Alignment Faking
  • Data Poisoning
  • Hardware Trojans
  • Hardware Bias in AI

3.    It was a stimulating exchange on the cutting-edge security innovations and threats that will define the coming years, particularly in the context of military conflicts and the cybersecurity industry. Grateful to DSCI for hosting such an impactful event, and looking forward to the continued advancements in these critical fields.

#DSCIBPM2025 #CyberSecurity #QuantumTechnology #MachineLearning #PQC #HomomorphicEncryption #ZTA #ZeroTrust #PostQuantumBlockchain #TechForGood






#DSCIBPM2025 #CyberSecurity #QuantumTech #MachineLearning #TechInnovation

Sunday, January 12, 2025

Why the NCSC (UK) is Cautious About Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) for Government and Military Use ?

1.    Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is often hailed as a groundbreaking technology in the world of cybersecurity. By harnessing the principles of quantum mechanics, it promises secure key distribution between two parties, immune to eavesdropping. However, despite its potential, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) had explicitly denied its endorsement for government and military applications  few years back. {Source: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/quantum-security-technologies}. Here's why my opine:

  • Specialist Hardware Requirement: QKD relies on complex and expensive hardware, including photon detectors and optical fibers. This infrastructure is difficult to deploy and maintain, making it impractical for widespread use, especially in sensitive and large-scale applications like government and military communications.

  • Lack of Digital Signatures: Unlike traditional cryptographic systems, QKD doesn’t support digital signatures, which are crucial for verifying the authenticity of messages. Without this feature, QKD cannot fully replace current security systems that ensure data integrity and authentication.

    • Why doesn't QKD support digital signatures?

      • Nature of QKD: QKD’s purpose is to create a shared secret key between two parties. It does not provide the functionality of encrypting data or verifying identities, which is what digital signatures do.
      • Digital signatures require private keys to sign a message and verify it with a public key. While QKD can be used to securely exchange the private keys needed for traditional cryptographic schemes (e.g., for RSA or ECDSA), QKD itself is not designed to perform signing operations.

Source: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/quantum-security-technologies

Integration with Traditional Systems

2.    While QKD doesn't support digital signatures directly, it can be used in conjunction with traditional cryptographic systems. For instance, after using QKD to securely share a key, the parties can use that key with a traditional system to perform tasks like encryption, decryption, or creating digital signatures.

  • Limited Range and Scalability: QKD's effectiveness is limited by the distance over which it can securely transmit keys. With current technology, it only works over relatively short distances and is not easily scalable, especially for large-scale, long-range communication networks.

  • Evolving Quantum Threats: While QKD is designed to withstand future quantum computer threats, quantum research is still advancing, and new vulnerabilities may emerge. Until these risks are fully understood, relying solely on QKD for critical infrastructure would be premature.

3.    In conclusion, while QKD holds promise for the future, its current limitations in hardware, functionality, and scalability make it an impractical solution for government and military use at this stage. For now, more established and reliable cryptographic methods are preferred to secure sensitive communications.

Wednesday, August 21, 2024

Cryptographic Inventory: A Crucial Step in the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography

The Emergence of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic standards. Quantum computers, with their ability to perform complex calculations at unprecedented speeds, can potentially break many widely used encryption algorithms. As a result, there is an urgent need to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), algorithms designed to resist attacks from both classical and quantum computers.

The Importance of Cryptographic Inventory

To ensure a smooth and secure transition to PQC, it is essential to conduct a thorough cryptographic inventory. A cryptographic inventory is a comprehensive list of all cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and systems used within an organization or nation. This inventory provides valuable insights into the current cryptographic landscape, helping to identify vulnerabilities, prioritize migration efforts, and develop effective strategies for adopting PQC.


Steps to Conduct a Cryptographic Inventory

  • Identify Cryptographic Assets: This involves identifying all systems, applications, and devices that use cryptographic algorithms, including hardware, software, and cloud-based services.
  • Document Cryptographic Algorithms: For each identified asset, document the specific cryptographic algorithms and protocols being used.
  • Assess Vulnerability: Evaluate the vulnerability of each algorithm to quantum attacks based on the latest research and expert assessments.
  • Prioritize Migration: Based on the vulnerability assessment, prioritize the migration of critical systems to PQC.
  • Develop a Migration Plan: Create a detailed plan outlining the steps, timelines, and resources required for the migration process.

    As PQC standards have already released @ FIPS 203-204-205 and would continue to evolve, it is imperative for organizations and nations to prepare for the transition. A cryptographic inventory is a fundamental step in this process, providing essential information for risk assessment, migration planning, and compliance. By conducting a thorough inventory and developing a comprehensive migration strategy, organizations can ensure the security and resilience of their cryptographic infrastructure in the face of emerging quantum threats.

Monday, August 19, 2024

NIST Unveils Final Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards: A New Era Begins

    Last week the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released the final versions of their post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards: FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205. This marks the end of an extensive eight-year process involving submission, research, and analysis....and the journey to a quantum era begins and so will be the associated business industry

    This long-anticipated development represents a major milestone in the evolution of PQC. It will influence the cryptographic systems used across various sectors, including data transmission networks, online financial transactions, and military device connectivity. Consequently, chips, devices, software applications, and supply chain components will now need to comply with these new PQC standards.




Tuesday, March 26, 2024

Demystifying PQC with a Mind Map: NIST Competition & Theoretical Foundations

The world of cryptography is constantly evolving, and with the rise of quantum computers, traditional encryption methods are becoming vulnerable. Enter Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) – a set of new algorithms designed to resist attacks from these powerful machines.

This blog post offers a unique resource: a downloadable mind map that breaks down the complexities of PQC and the NIST standardization process.

What you'll find in the mind map:

  • A clear overview of all four rounds of the NIST PQC competition. This includes the different candidate algorithms and their functionalities.
  • A breakdown of the theoretical basis of PQC. Explore the underlying mathematical concepts that make these algorithms resistant to quantum attacks.
  • A visual representation of the relationships between different PQC schemes and their security properties.

Call to action

Download the mind map today and gain a comprehensive understanding of PQC and its journey through NIST standardization. This mind map is perfect for anyone interested in cryptography, cybersecurity, or the future of secure communication.

SVG Download link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/12k31FIzD92qYy-CmiWO7529S7Kpz69Hs/view?usp=sharing

PDF Download link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vCO7SQF6TAW2oI4-lpgA7fXlouObStJT/view?usp=sharing

PQC in a Flash: A Downloada... by Anupam Tiwari

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